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2It is traditional to approach the absolute-relational debate about the nature of
space and motion via the views of Newton and Leibniz. And, of course, since their views
developed against the backdrop of Cartesian physics, it is often helpful to keep this in
mind when approaching their writings on these subjects.
Many treatments of the history of the debate in the literature on the philosophy of
space and time begin with these three figures. In briefest outline, the story runs as
follows. (1) Descartes defined the place of a body via its relations to its immediate
neighbours and motion as change of place so-conceived. He attempted to base upon this
notion a mechanistic physics governed by rules of impact and the principle of inertia. The
result was a disappointing mess. (2) Newton defined the state of motion of a body as its
motion relative to absolute space—the latter he thought of as a non-material existent,
neither substance nor accident, consisting of parts that maintain their identity through
time. This provided the conceptual underpinnings for his laws of motion. The result was a
resounding success. (3) Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes’s and Newton’s accounts of
space and motion have exercised a considerable influence on natural philosophical
discussions down to the present day. But his attempts at constructing a systematic and
credible competitor to the physics of his rivals never came to fruition—in part, it seems,
because Leibniz was pulled in several contradictory directions by his critical intuitions. In
particular, it is hard to see how to fit together his relational account of space (which
would seem to undercut any notion of absolute motion) with his views about force (which
would appear to ground absolute notions of motion).
3Of course, philosophical debates about the nature of motion and space began long
before the 17th century. Indeed, the views of Descartes and Newton are closely related to
certain ancient views. And in antiquity, through the middle ages, and down to the 17th
century, one finds many arguments for and against these views, including precursors of
some of the arguments that figured in the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence, and which still
drive much of the philosophy of space and time. All of this is well-known historians of
these periods, but is less widely-appreciated among philosophers of space and time. In
these notes, I hope to remedy this situation a bit, by providing a sketch some of this
earlier history. In the concluding section I make some remarks about what was genuinely
novel to the 17th century context.
***
The natural place to begin is with Aristotle. In Aristotle the finite material world
is organized into a spherical cosmos. The Earth sits at rest at the centre of this cosmos;
above the atmosphere, are a series of nested spheres rotating about the Earth; the Moon,
Sun, planets, and stars are fixed to these spheres; and the composition of the circular
motions of these spheres gives rise to the motions of the heavenly bodies through the sky.
The matter of the Aristotelian cosmos forms a plenum. Thus every body is
surrounded by matter; this allows Aristotle to take the place of a body to be “the
boundary of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body”
(Physics IV.4, 212a5–7).1 Or at least, this works for bodies in the interior of the cosmos:
“the heaven … is not anywhere as a whole, nor in any place, if at least, as we must
                                                 
1 All translations of Aristotle from McKeon (ed.) (1941).
4suppose, no body contains it” (212a8–10). We nonetheless say that the outermost sphere
of the heavens—the sphere of the fixed stars—completes one revolution each day.2
Aristotle had to contend with atomists, who claimed that movement would be
impossible in a plenum and posited a cosmology involving infinitely many atoms moving
through an infinite void. To the atomists’ claim about the impossibility of motion in a
plenum, Aristotle retorted, reasonably enough, that “not even movement in respect of
place involves a void; for bodies may simultaneously make room for one another, though
there is no interval separate and apart from the bodies that are in movement. And this is
plain even in the rotation of continuous things, as in that of liquids” (Physics, IV.7
214a28–32).
Aristotle also provides positive arguments against the possibility of a void—not
only is there no space empty of matter within the cosmos, but the cosmos itself is not to
be thought of as immersed in a larger void space.
(1) In De Caelo, void is characterized as “that in which the presence of body, though not
actual, is possible” (I.9 279a14–15). But it is not possible for there to be matter beyond
the cosmos: such matter could not be there naturally, for the natural place of earth, water,
air, fire, and the heavenly material is within the cosmos; nor could it have gotten there by
violence, for in that case it would have to be located in the natural place of some other
matter—and there is none such. So an extra-cosmic void is impossible.3 The same
argument is supposed to show that there can be no other worlds located outside of our
own.
                                                 
2 I believe that we are supposed to reach this conclusion by regarding the Earth as fixed, then examining the
relative motion between each of the surrounding spheres; see Sorabji (1988, 193–196) for discussion of
ancient reactions.
3 There is some reason to think that that Aristotle here assumes that something is possible only if it happens
at some time or other; see Hahm (1977, 103 especially fn. 32).
5(2) In the Physics, Aristotle tells us that the partisans of the void regard “it as a sort of
place or vessel which is supposed to be ‘full’ when it holds the bulk of which it is capable
of containing, ‘void’ when it is deprived of that—as if ‘void,’ and ‘full’ and ‘place’
denoted the same thing, though the essence of the three is different” (IV.6 213a15–20).
Aristotle offers a series of objections to the void in Book IV, Chapter 8, showing that a
body immersed in a void would be both motionless and move with an infinite velocity,
etc. These arguments turn upon the details of the Aristotelian account of natural place,
motion through resisting media, etc., and they exercised a considerable influence on
medieval discussions of the possibility and nature of motion in a void (see Grant 1981a,
Chapter 3)—but they need not concern us here. To these we can add the following
remark that occurs in the preamble to Aristotle’s discussion of place: “place cannot be
body; for if it were there would be two bodies in the same place” (Physics, IV.1 209a6–7;
see also IV.8 216a34–b10). Many of Aristotle’s medieval successors saw here a powerful
consideration against the possibility of the void. For if the void is conceived of as a sort
of three-dimensional entity capable of being filled by body, then we must accept that
when it is so filled, we have two things existing in the same place—an absurdity.4
***
Now, these views of Aristotle were subject to trenchant criticism throughout
antiquity, among the scholastics, and in the early modern period. Let me begin by noting
three anti-Aristotelian arguments which are of special concern for our purposes. (These
are chosen because they were influential from antiquity through the 17th century; no claim
is made that they provide even a fair sample of historical arguments.)
                                                 
4 For the medieval influence of this argument, see Grant (1981a, e.g., 32 ff.).
6(1) Paradoxes of Aristotelian Motion. If, as is natural, (local) movement is understood as
change of place, then the Aristotelian definition of place leads to counter-intuitive
consequences: a body such as a tower moves (because air surrounding it constantly
circulates); similarly, bodies can approach one another even if neither moves. These
observations provide an argument against the Aristotelian accounts of place and local
motion.
(2) Arguments from Cosmic Size and Shape. Presumably the cosmos does or could
change shape, or could have been a different size or shape—and this seems to suggest
that there must be void outside of the cosmos in order to make this so.
(3) Arguments from Possible Motions. Our intuitions recognize the possible states of
motions which must be understood as motion relative to the parts of a separately existing
void—no account of motion in terms of the relations between material parts will suffice.
This provides another sort of argument in favour of the void.
***
I will make some remarks about the history of each of these families of
objections, beginning with the Paradoxes of Aristotelian Motion.
Under this heading we find arguments directed against the Aristotelian definition
of place. They appear to have first emerged in the writings of Aristotle’s immediate
successor, Theophrastus (see Sorabji 1988, Chapter 11), and to have played some role in
the rejection by the Aristotelian majority in antiquity of Aristotle’s conception of the
place of a body as the boundary of the surrounding bodies (on this see Sorabji 1988,
199–201). In the middle ages, when Aristotle’s account of place was widely accepted
(Grant 1976, 154), these paradoxes were rediscovered and widely discussed (Grant
71981a, 125; 1981b, ß2). In the 17th century, they were available even to non-scholastic
philosophers in, e.g., the Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana of Walter
Charleton (p. 69).5
It is clear that these arguments create difficulties for Aristotle. He affirms in his
Physics that: “It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place
that what changes changes” (200b33–34); and later he is quite specific in identifying
locomotion with change of place (260a27–28). And so it seems clear that he regards a
body as moving (in our sense) if and only if there is a change along its immediate
boundary. And so, prima facie, it seems that a boat moored in a strong current will count
as moving, while one drifting downstream along with the current may count as at rest
(depending what whether we require the individual parts of water along its surface to be
at rest, and whether they in fact are).
Now, it isn’t clear whether the charge in this form will stick. At one point
Aristotle departs from his original characterization of the motion of a body in terms of
what is happening at the immediate boundary of the body and maintains instead that:
“when what is within a thing which is moved, is moved and changes its place, as a boat
on a river, what contains plays the part of a vessel rather than of place. Place on the other
hand is rather what is motionless: so it is rather the whole river that is place, because as a
whole it is motionless. Hence we conclude that the innermost motionless boundary of
what contains is place” (212a15–19). Here is Burnyeat’s influential reading:
The point of the refinement is this: the place of X was to be the boundary of Y enclosing X, but if
Y is moving, this specifies a carrier or vessel of X rather than X’s place …. The solution is to find
                                                 
5 This last work is of interest in part because Newton is known to have read it carefully as an undergraduate
(Westfall 1962, 172, especially fn. 5). It is an eccentrically augmented free translation of a work by
Gassendi—and it played a pivotal role in making available in English Gassendi’s attempts to Christianize
and modernize atomism.
8Z such that Z is static and Z encloses X at the same boundary as Y does. Example: X=a boat,
Y=the body of water flowing in the Cayster, Z=the river Cayster as a geographical entity. (1997,
102 n. 15)
There is a question of coherence here. Our system of judgments about place and motion
will be founded upon an initial choice of a body which counts as motionless. Considering
a different body as motionless at the beginning would result in different judgments about
place and motion. Now in Aristotle’s scheme, it is clearly safe to count the Earth as
motionless, and to work outwards from there. But then place is specified by position
relative to the surface of the Earth, and motion by change of distance with respect to
reference points on the surface of the Earth. So Aristotle’s attempt to shore up his
definitions of place and motion lead quickly to them being superseded by quite different
ones. Indeed, one strand of Scholastic thought followed this course (Grant 1981b, §3),
referring motion ultimately to change of a body’s relation to the immobile centre and
poles of the cosmic sphere (presumably it went unnoticed that a body moving along the
equator of the cosmic sphere would count as immobile under this criterion).
***
Now turn we to the positive arguments offered by proponents of the void—the
arguments from cosmic size and shape and the arguments from cosmic motion. Here it is
convenient to discuss both arguments together, moving from one group of commentators
to the next.
T HE ATOMISTS. The atomist cosmology featured an infinite number of indivisible
particles moving in an infinite void. Our cosmos formed by chance, and will eventually
decay—it is one of an infinite number of cosmoi.
9Against the finite spherical universe of Aristotle, Lucretius deploys (De Rerum
Natura, I.968–983) an argument attributed by ancient authors to Archytas (contemporary
of Plato and teacher of Eudoxus): if you are situated at the edge of the cosmos, what
happens if you extend your staff (or spear, or sword, …) beyond the edge? If there is
something there to prevent its extension, then you were not yet at the edge—there is
further matter. On the other hand, if you are successful, then there must be receptive void.
Repeating the argument whenever a new putative boundary is reached shows that there is
infinite extension—of either matter or void.6
Lucretius also gives two detailed arguments in favour of the void, defined as
“intangible empty space” (I.334).7 The first rests upon the traditional atomist contention
that motion would be impossible in a plenum.8 The second, cleaned up and amplified,
proceeds thus: suppose two bodies in contact along a surface move away from one
another; then air must fill the space between the surfaces initially in contact; but if it
moves with only finite velocity, there will be void immediately after the separation of the
bodies.9 Following this discussion, Lucretius remarks that:
If there were no place and space, which we call void,
Bodies could not be situated anywhere
And they would totally lack the power of movement
As I explained a little while ago.10
                                                 
6 For discussion of origins of this argument and of Aristotelian responses in antiquity, see Sorabji (1988,
125–128). For Scholastic responses, see Grant (1981a, 106–108). The argument also appears in More
(Koyré 1957, 123) and Gassendi (Grant 1981a, 389 n. 168). Here is another popular atomist argument: that
which is limited must be limited by something (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 41; Lucretius, De Rerum
Natura, I.957–965);
on this see Sorabji (1988, 136–138) and Grant (1981a).
7 All quotations of Lucretius from Melville (trans.) (1997).
8 De Rerum Natura, I.335-345 and I.370-383. See also Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 40. Note Aristotle’s
response, Physics, IV.7 214a28–32. See Charelton, Physiologia, 19. Note: the undergraduate Newton
appears to have accepted this argument; Westfall (1962, 174).
9 De Rerum Natura, I.384-389. See Grant (1981a, §4.E) for Scholastic responses to this sort of challenge.
10 I.418-421. See also Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 40: “And if there did not exist that which we call void
and space and intangible nature, bodies would have no place to be in or move through, as they obviously do
move” (translation of Inwood and Gerson 1994).
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Now, he has earlier told us how bodies could not move if there were no void. But that
they would be situated nowhere is a new thought, and one on which he never really
elaborates.  I do not think it much of a stretch to think of Lucretius as taking for granted
something like absolute space here: his void, as an infinite three-dimensional non-
corporeal entity provides a standard of place and movement for bodies—a body changes
place if it occupies a new portion of void and the state of motion of a body is referred to
its change of place in the void.
Indeed, it is not easy to see how we can otherwise make sense of certain
characteristic atomist theses. At least from Epicurus onward, atomists held that the void
has a natural distinguished direction, downwards, and that the natural motion of atoms is
downwards, with atoms of all sizes moving at the same speed.11 In Lucretius (and,
according to ancient authorities, in Epicurus as well—see Inwood and Gerson (eds.)
(1994, 47)) we find that this natural motion is sporadically interrupted by the mysterious
swerve which puts atoms on collision courses; these collisions are ultimately responsible
for the formation of cosmic vortices. As Lucretius notes, without the swerve, the atoms
Would fall like drops of rain through the void.
There would be no collisions, no impacts
Of atoms upon atom, so that nature
Would never have created anything. (I.222–225)
The most obvious way for us to make sense of this is to refer the motion of atoms to the
parts of the void, conceived of as retaining their identity over time. For if we look at the
relations between the atoms in the swerveless atomist universe, we find them utterly
static—and we would have no reason to maintain that the atoms were falling down like
drops of rain rather than sitting motionless.
                                                 
11 See Furley (1987, Chapters 9 and 10) for discussion of pre-Epicurean atomism.
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THE STOICS. The Stoics, while accepting a spherical and void-free cosmos, explicitly
located it within an infinite void (see, e.g., Hahn 1977, 103–107). Now, the Stoics more
or less accept Aristotle’s terms—void is that which is capable of being occupied by
matter, but is not so occupied. But in favour of the void they offer arguments of the sort
that we are interested in.
(1) The cosmos could be/could have been a different shape—so there must be receptive
void. The Stoic cosmos is subject to periodic destruction by conflagration, during which
the volume of matter is increased many fold.12 So there exists at least some void outside
of the cosmos. According to Simplicius, some Stoics employed Archytas’ argument to
show that the void must in fact be infinite (Hahn 1977, 106).
(2) The possibility of motion of the entire world shows that there must be an infinite void.
This argument appears in Cleomedes:
we can conceive the cosmos itself moving out of the place which it happens to occupy now. And
together with its motion, we shall conceive the abandoned place as being empty and the place to
which it is moved to be occupied and held by it. This latter place would be a filled void.13
Presumably we should add: But there is no limit to the direction, velocity, or duration of
this movement, so we must conceive of the void as being infinitely extended in all
directions.
                                                 
12 Thus, Cleomedes, believed to be early AD: “And if furthermore all substance is reduced to fire, as the
most gifted physicists think, it must occupy a place more than ten thousand times as great, just like solid
bodies when they are vaporised into smoke. So the place that is occupied by dissolved substance in the
conflagration is now void, seeing that no body fills it”; quoted at Sorabji (1988, 129).
13 Quoted at Sorabji (1988, 129 f). Cleomedes himself denied that the cosmos was in fact in motion; see the
passage at Sambursky (1959, 143 f.). Achilles the Grammarian records the following Stoic argument “If the
cosmos were moving down in an infinite void, rain would not overtake the earth. But it does. Therefore the
cosmos does not move but stands still” (Hahm 1977, 109 f.). Some Stoics questioned the coherence of the
notion of a moving cosmos (see Hahm 1977, 122).
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Now this last argument is of fundamental importance. In Archytas’ argument and
in the argument from the conflagration, the existence of the void functions only as a sort
of place-holder for possible deformations or expansions of the cosmos. But even if such a
deformation or expansion were to take place, one would still be able to understand place
and motion in broadly Aristotelian terms—place could be defined in terms of material
extension, and motion in terms of relative motion, given some body truly at rest. But with
Cleomedes’ thought experiment regarding the possible motion of the cosmos as a whole
this is no longer possible—the thought experiment is only coherent if the void itself plays
a role in defining place and motion. Cleomedes wants us to judge that in the situation
described the cosmos is moving through the void—because it successively occupies
different parts of the void, rather than because of any characteristic relative motion
between its parts.
This suggests that, for some Stoics at least, the void ought to be viewed as an
infinite three-dimensional entity, whose parts maintain their identity over time and
provide the ultimate grounding for the notions of place and motion.14
THE SCHOLASTICS. No brief summary can do justice to the full range of Scholastic
mutations of Aristotelianism. From Edward Grant I take the following points.
(1) The Aristotelian account of place remained essentially unchallenged throughout the
medieval period (Grant 1976, 154), despite active discussion of the paradoxes of motion
and problems regarding the motion of cosmic sphere (1981b).
                                                 
14 This is the standard interpretation of the Stoic void, developed, e.g., in Hahm (1977, Chapter IV) and
Sambursky (1959, Chapter IV). An alternative interpretation is argued for in Todd (1982) and Inwood
(1991).
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(2) There was a unanimous consensus among medieval scholastics that the cosmos could
not be thought of as immersed in an extended, three-dimensional void (Grant 1981a,
180). Grant identifies a theological basis for this consensus, in scholastic reluctance to
recognize any infinite being in addition to God.15 In this context, Aristotle’s complaint
that if void could be occupied by body, then two things would be in the same place was
widely accepted as a decisive argument (Grant 1969; 1981a, Chapters 1 and 2).
(3) This position seems entirely compatible with Scholastic use of arguments showing
that the world could have been larger that it was, or differently shaped. Archytas’
argument was communicated to the Scholastics in works of Simplicius, and was
afterwards widely discussed (Grant 1981a, 106 f.). It was also noted that God could have
chosen to create a larger world than he had (Grant 1981a, 137; see also Sorabji 1988,
129). But, of course, this is consistent with the insistence that the extra-cosmic void is not
an extended entity.
(4) In 1277, theologians in Paris, fighting a rearguard action against Aristotelians in the
faculty of arts, managed to have a number of propositions condemned by the Bishop of
Paris. For a time, the teaching of these propositions was punishable by excommunication.
Even after this penalty was lifted, the condemnation continued to have an effect: the
condemned propositions continued to be eschewed by conscientious writers. Among the
propositions condemned, we find the following.16
• “That there is no more excellent state than to study philosophy.”
• “That the only wise men in the world are philosophers.”
• “That one should not hold anything unless it is self-evident or can be manifested from self-evident
principles.”
• “That if the heaven stood still, fire would not burn flax because God would not exist.”
• “That a sphere is the immediate efficient cause of all forms.”
                                                 
15 This was not, however, viewed as problematic by early Christians; see Sambursky (1982, 14–17).
16 These are propositions 1, 2, 4, 79, 81, 97, 149, 178, 203, 205, and 66 in the numbering and translation
found in Lerner and Mahdi (1963, Selection 18).
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• “That it pertains to the dignity of the higher cause to be able to commit errors and produce monsters
unintentionally, since nature is able to do this.”
• “That the intellect of the dead Socrates does not have the science of those things of which it once had
science.”
• “That by certain signs one knows men’s intentions and changes of intention, and whether these
intentions are to be carried out, and that by means of these prefigurations one knows the arrival of
strangers, the enslavement of men, the release of captives, and whether those who are coming are
acquaintances of thieves.”
• “That one should not confess, except for the sake of appearance.”
• “That simple fornication, namely that of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman, is not a sin.”
• “That God could not move the heaven in a straight line, the reason being that He would then leave a
vacuum.”
It has been argued that the inclusion of this last proposition had momentous
consequences for the development of the concept of space—for in the 14th century one
finds a number of Scholastics happy to say that God could move the cosmos through the
void, or was faced with a choice about where in the void to create the cosmos (see Grant
1979 and Lindberg 1992, 233–244). It is difficult to see how the possibility of the
translation of the world as a whole along a straight line can be underwritten by anything
short of the an extended void whose parts maintain their identity through time, thus
providing a standard of place and motion independent of body.
THE EARLY MODERNS ATOMISTS. Spurred in part by a flood of previously unavailable
ancient texts, the 16th and 17th centuries saw a large number of non-Aristotelian accounts
of place, space, void, motion, matter and the cosmos (see Koyré 1957 and Grant 1981a,
Chapters 7 and 8). It is helpful to note here one particular strand of development which
pre-figured—and indeed, directly influenced—Newton’s account absolute space:
Gassendi’s attempt to revive and Christianize ancient atomism.
Gassendi self-consciously mines ancient and scholastic authors for arguments. His
cosmology features a single material world, created by God and composed of atoms,
immersed in an infinite three-dimensional void space, itself neither substance nor
15
accident, and suffused with the omnipresence of God.17 In Gassendi and/or his English
disciple Charleton, we find the following arguments and claims. (1) The paradoxes of
motion cause difficulties for any Aristotelian account of motion (Charleton 1966, 69). (2)
The argument of Archytas for the existence of an infinite void (see Grant 1981a, 389 n.
168). (3) God could have created the universe larger than it is (Charleton 1966, 11), or
could repeatedly annihilate the universe and created a larger version—so the void must
be infinite (Brush (ed.) 1972, 387). (4) We can conceive God moving the material world
from one location to another (Brush (ed.) 1972, 388; Charelton 1966, 67 f.).
***
Obviously this is only the tip of the iceberg. But I hope I have given some feeling
for the wealth of interesting arguments and theses salient to the absolute-relational debate
that pre-date Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, but which reverberate through, e.g.,
Newton’s De Gravitatione and through the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence. In closing, I
would like to make some more speculative remarks about what was new in discussion of
space and motion in the 17th century.
The new mathematical physics of the 17th century took over from astronomy the
practice of representing the motions of bodies by curves in Euclidean space,
parameterized by time. The course of the century saw a progressive widening of the
scope and ambitions of this new physics, with its dynamical treatment of the motion of
bodies: from its first specimens in Galileo’s treatment of free fall and projectile motion
near the Earth; to Descartes’ qualitative modeling of the celestial motions via vortices; to
the competing quantitative accounts of the system of the world offered by Newton and
                                                 
17 For references to others who rejected the substance-attribute dichotomy in the case of space, see Grant
(1981a, 187, 199, 204, 217, 240, and 392 nn. 182 and 185).
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the later vortex theorists (including Leibniz). The first half of the 17th century also saw
the decisive rejection by astronomers and natural philosophers of Ptolemaic astronomy
and the Aristotelian cosmology in which it was set. Of course, these two sets of
developments were related to one another in many ways. I would like to emphasize just
one aspect by claiming that the transition from Aristotelian cosmology to the new
cosmologies of the 17th century undermined the most straightforward route to interpreting
the geometrical curves in Euclidean space as representing the motions of bodies; and that
the competing accounts of the nature of space, the nature of motion, and the relation
between the two that one finds in Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz can be viewed as
aspects of the process of recognition and resolution of this problem.
From Galileo onwards, the new mechanics was based on one form or another of
the principle of inertia, according to which bodies free from interference naturally tend to
trace out a certain sort of curve in space. The interpretation of curves in Euclidean space
as representing the motion of bodies is unproblematic in contexts in which the motion of
all bodies can be understood as motions relative to a natural reference body. For then,
speaking anachronistically, one can regard the curves as describing motion in the space
picked out by coordinate axes attached to the reference body. The location of a moving
body relative to the fixed body is determined at each moment of time by the
parameterization of the geometrical curve associated with the moving body.
In the mainstream cosmological tradition deriving from Aristotle and Ptolemy, the
Earth is at rest at the center of a finite series of rotating material spheres which exhaust
the contents of the universe (there is nothing—not even empty space—lies beyond the
sphere of the fixed stars). In this context the Earth provides a geometrically privileged,
17
fixed body—the natural reference body to which the complicated trajectories of
Ptolemaic astronomy can be referred.
For Copernicus and Kepler, the cosmos is still spherical, and both the central sun
and the outer surface which encloses the fixed stars are immobile, and are suitable to
serve as reference bodies (Koyré 1957, 29–34, 76–87). According to Copernicus, the
stars are fixed to the surface of the outermost sphere; according to Kepler they are
scattered throughout a shell within the outermost sphere, with the shell enclosing a void
in which the solar system is located. Copernicus is quite explicit: “the first and supreme
of all is the sphere of the fixed stars which contains everything and itself and which,
therefore, is at rest. Indeed, it is the place of the world to which are referred the motion
and the position of all other stars” (quoted at Koyré 1957, 33; of course here the planets,
including the earth, are numbered among the “other stars”).
Galileo, on the other hand,  is able to understand the curves that terrestrial bodies
trace out in his mechanics as curves relative to the Earth, treated as fixed. But of course,
he is also a partisan of the Copernican system, and maintains against Tycho Brahe and
Ptolemy that the Earth rotates daily and moves through the heavens annually. And he can
make sense of these claims, if he wishes—for like Copernicus and Kepler he maintains
that “the fixed stars (which are so many suns) agree with our sun in enjoying perpetual
rest” (1967, 327).18
                                                 
18 Galileo, while content to grant for the sake of argument that the cosmos is spherical in shape, he makes a
point of noting that there is little evidence that the material universe is finite in extent (1967, 319 f.). And
indeed, he appears to have been genuinely undecided on—and quite likely, not especially interested
in—questions concerning the finitude or infinitude of the number of stars, and of the displacement of the
stars in space (see Koyré 1957, 95–99).
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But as the century progressed, new cosmologies emerged in which the Earth
orbits the Sun along with the other planets, while the Sun itself is just another star, and
the great multitude of stars is scattered haphazardly across space.
In this new context, the Earth no longer provides a natural reference body for the
interpretation of the motion of bodies in terms of geometrical curves. Not only does the
Earth itself move, but being banished from the center of the cosmos, it no longer able to
claim privilege over any other body. Being motionless, the Sun is suited to serve the
purpose—though, being banished from the center of the universe, it can no longer claim
any privilege over the other stars. What is needed is an account of motion that refers
motions to something other than body, or one which grapples directly with the fact that
only some reference bodies are suitable to refer motions to (in the sense that the law of
inertia does not hold if all motion is referred to a body in an arbitrary state of motion.
It was of course Newton who first saw clearly the difficulties involved. He
showed that Descartes’s analysis of motion in terms of the separation of contiguous
bodies was unable to provide the conceptual scaffolding required to make sense of the
principle of inertia and concluded that absolute space provided the best foundation for the
new mathematical natural philosophy.19
But Kepler seems to have already sensed the difficulties that lay ahead—in
rejecting the notion of an infinite material universe, he remarks that “This very cogitation
carries with it I don’t know what secret, hidden horror; indeed, one finds oneself
wandering in this immensity, to which are denied limits and center and therefore also all
determinate places” (quoted at Koyré 1957, 61).
                                                 
19 For Newton’s treatment of Descartes’s analysis of motion, see especially the passage on pp. 19–21 of
Janiak (ed.) (2004). Spinoza appears to make a similar point in Corollary 3 to Proposition 22 in Part 2 of
The Principle of Cartesian Philosophy.
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